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analysis impossible. This paper is an attempt to move discussion beyond the debate over 
the scope of the problems that can be handled effectively to cases where it is clear that 
there is insufficient computational or engineering resource to perform an analysis deemed 
to be adequately complete. Under these conditions, it is important to consider the 
expected costs and benefits of alternative computation and knowledge-acquisition 
strategies. The paper focuses on incorporating knowledge about inference-related costs 
associated with the use of alternative inference strategies under varying time constraints. 
It discusses how knowledge about he structure of user utility can be used to control 
computational value trade-offs for tailoring inference to alternative contexts. In this 
regard, a framework and language for the formal meta-level analysis of problem 
formulation and inference is introduced. Finally, the notion of real-time rationality is 
addressed, focusing on the application of knowledge about the expected timewise- 
refinement abilities of reasoning strategies to balance the benefits of additional 
computation with the costs of acting with a partial result. 
Dempster-Shafer versus Probabilistic Logic 
Daniel Hunter 
Northrop Research and Technology Center, One Research Park, 
Palos Verdes Peninsula, California 90274 
The combination of evidence in Dempster-Shafer theory is compared with the 
combination f evidence in probabilistic logic. Sufficient conditions are stated for these 
two methods to agree. It is then shown that these conditions are minimal in the sense that 
disagreement can occur when any one of them is removed. An example is given in which 
the traditional ssumption of conditional independence of evidence on hypotheses holds 
and a uniform prior is assumed, but probabilistic logic and Dempster's rule give radically 
different results for the combination of two evidence vents. 
Higher Order Probabilities 
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester, 
New York 14627 
A number of writers have supposed that for the full specification of belief, higher order 
probabilities are required. Some have even supposed that there may be an unending 
sequence of higher order probabilities ofprobabilities ofprobabilities . . . .  In the present 
paper it is shown that higher order probabilities can always be replaced by the marginal 
distributions ofjoint probability distributions. The discussion considers both the case in 
which higher order probabilities are of the same sort as lower order probabilities and that 
in which higher order probabilities are distinct in character, as when lower order 
probabilities are construed as frequencies and higher order probabilities are construed as 
subjective degrees of belief. In neither case do higher order probabilities appear to offer 
any advantages, either conceptually or computationally. 
